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SOMEONE TO WATCH OVER ME: MEDICAL 
MONITORING COSTS UNDER CERCLA 
Kathryn E. Hand* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)l as a comprehen-
sive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast 
problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste 
sites.2 CERCLA's primary objectives are to facilitate prompt re-
sponses to hazardous substance releases, and to ensure their cleanup.3 
Under CERCLA, these objectives are accomplished in one of two 
ways: where the government is able to ascertain the identity of the 
parties potentially responsible for the release of hazardous sub-
stances, it gives those parties the choice of managing the cleanup 
themselves, or of funding a cleanup by the government.4 Where the 
government is unable to determine the parties responsible for gener-
ating or disposing of hazardous wastes, cleanup costs are covered by 
the "Superfund" created under CERCLA.5 
CERCLA's provisions, however, are broader than the term 
"cleanup" may indicate. Under section 107(a) of the Act, responsible 
parties6 shall be liable for any other necessary costs of response 
* Managing Editor, 1993-1994, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
2 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 17-18 (1980). 
3 See id. at 17. 
4 See Dan A. Tanenbaum, Note, When Does Gaing to the Doctor Serve the Public Health?, 59 
U. CHI. L. REV. 925, 925 (1992). 
5 See U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988). 
6 Under this section, "responsible parties" include owners or operators of vessels or facilities 
producing or disposing of hazardous substances, any person who transports or arranges for the 
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incurred by any other person consistent with the National Contin-
gency Plan.7 CERCLA's drafters neglected to define the phrase "any 
other necessary costs of response," and although they did define the 
term "response" as a "removal" or "remedial" action,s the scope of this 
definition is also uncertain. The ambiguity of the definition of the term 
"response" combined with the uncertainty of its meaning when used 
in the phrase "any other necessary costs of response" make it difficult, 
if not impossible, to draw from the statute a coherent and applicable 
picture of just what CERCLA response actions cover.9 As a result of 
this confusion, a great deal of the responsibility of interpreting CER-
CLA has been left to the courts. 
One of the areas impacted by the ambiguity in CERCLA's language 
is the question of whether to include medical monitoring costs in the 
CERCLA definition of response costs. This issue most often arises in 
cases considering awards to victims of exposure to hazardous sub-
stances who suffer from injuries they claim result from exposure to 
particular hazardous substances, or who fear that they will suffer such 
illness in the future.1O The question recently received its first appellate 
review, receiving an answer in the negative, with the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals' decision in Daigle v. Shell Oil CoY The frequency 
with which this issue comes to the attention of the state courts in-
creases as the courts come to recognize the dangers of latent disease 
caused by the improper production, transport, disposal and even 
cleanup of hazardous substancesP 
Recognizing that CERCLA was enacted as a means of redressing 
public, and not private wrongs,13 plaintiffs in medical monitoring suits 
point out that monitoring costs of varying kinds are sanctioned in the 
public health context under CERCLA's definitions for "removal" and 
''remedial actions."14 This approach, although unsuccessful in Daigle, 
transport of such substances for another, and any person who selects a disposal site from which 
there is a release or threatened release occasioning response costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(lH4) (1988). The NCP is an EPA-promulgated series of regulations 
regarding aspects of hazardous waste cleanups and cleanup plans. 
8 [d. § 9601(25). 
9 See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533~4 (10th Cir. 1992). 
10 See, e.g., id. at 1532. 
11 See generally id. 
12 See id. at 1533. 
13 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 925. 
14 Under § 9601(23), removal actions may include "such actions as may be necessary to 
monitor ... the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed 
material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or 
mitigate damage to the public health or welfare .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). Similarly, 
under section 9601(24), remedial actions include "any monitoring reasonably required to assure 
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finds support in a number of lower court decisions.15 The majority of 
the courts ruling favorably on medical monitoring claims do so based 
on arguments like that in Brewer v. Ravan.16 In Brewer, the plaintiffs 
claimed that both "remedial" and "removal" costs include medical 
monitoring costs, provided the monitoring is conducted to safeguard 
public health by assessing the effect of the release or discharge on the 
public or identifying potential public health problems presented by 
the releaseP 
This Comment proposes that public health-oriented medical moni-
toringI8 be instituted in all CERCLA response actions, either by 
standardizing judicial approaches to the question along Brewer lines,19 
or by amending CERCLA itself to make statutory provision for medi-
cal monitoring. Either of these methods would be effective in further-
ing CERCLXs purposes of protecting the public and the environ-
ment20 while dispensing with unnecessary litigation. Given the 
reluctance of most courts to create new law and the potential for 
abuse of a court-made system, however, the latter scheme is probably 
preferable. 
Section II of this Comment examines medical monitoring, including 
its possible purposes, and its treatment by the courts in the context 
of CERCLA actions for recovery of response costs. Section III pro-
vides an overview of CERCLA and the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (SARA). It briefly outlines their enforcement 
schemes, private recovery standards, and the main functions of the 
Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry (ATSDR) created 
under CERCLA section 9604(i). Section IV reviews CERCLXs leg-
islative history, both generally and as it pertains to the controversy 
surrounding the medical monitoring issue. Section V concludes that 
medical monitoring is a "response cost" by CERCLA definitions, and 
advocates its recognition as a valuable tool for tracking the spread 
that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment." Id. § 9601(24). 
See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1534. 
15 See, e.g., Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Williams v. Allied Automo-
tive, 704 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1988); Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1985). 
16 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
17 See generally Brewer, 680 F. Supp 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
18 The term public health-oriented medical monitoring is used to distinguish public-focus 
monitoring advocated in this Comment from more individualized diagnostic monitoring. 
19 This would require courts to distinguish "acceptable" medical monitoring of communities 
or groups from unacceptably "private" treatment of individuals, and to understand this moni-
toring as a part of the cleanup process itself, and so fundable under CERCLA provisions. 
20 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)--(24). 
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and effects of hazardous substance contamination on the public. It 
further urges that such monitoring should, as a research strategy, be 
incorporated into every CERCLA action, either by a revamped 
ATSDR, or by a companion agency modelled after and operating in 
cooperation with the ATSDR to monitor smaller, but nonetheless 
important sites. 
II. MEDICAL MONITORING 
As its uneven success rate in the courts indicates, medical monitor-
ing in the context of CERCLA cleanup actions is not an issue with 
which the courts are entirely comfortable.21 While nothing in CER-
CLA itself mandates a blanket prohibition against recovery of such 
monitoring costs,22 finding a way to incorporate these costs into CER-
CLA's already ambiguous text is difficult, and in the view of some 
courts, impossible.23 There are at least two reasons for this: first, 
monitoring's proponents must show their efforts are legitimate in 
view of CERCLA's language and purposes, and are not merely at-
tempts to disguise private suits in CERCLA clothing;24 second, and 
possibly more problematic, medical monitoring itself suffers from a 
lack of clear and consistent definition.25 Given this ambiguity, the 
courts are forced to consider a variety of actions under the same title. 
Medical monitoring cases include a spectrum of activities ranging 
from observations and diagnoses of individuals to examinations of 
health trends across populations as a means of tracking toxic contami-
nation.26 Predictably, the simple use of the term medical monitoring 
to characterize different kinds of observational actions has not magi-
cally enabled the courts to decide these cases consistently.27 
21 Jane E. Lein & Kevin M. Ward, Private Party Cost Recovery Under CERCLA, 21 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,322, 10,329--30 (1991). 
22 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. 
23 See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1992); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 
681 F. Supp. 651, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
24 See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537. 
25 See, e.g., Boyd v. Orkin Extermination Co., 381 S.E.2d 295, 298 (Ga. App. 1989) (mere 
exposure to toxic substances does not rise to the level of compensable injury); Ayers v. Jackson 
Township, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987) (plaintiffs granted cost of monitoring reasonably re-
quired to detect warning signs of serious disease). 
26 See, e.g., Daigle, 972 F.2d at 153:?ril3 (plaintiff class members' longterm health monitoring 
used to detect and prevent chronic disease); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, 788 F.2d 315 
(5th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's periodic medical checkups included in medical monitoring claim). 
27 See cases cited at note 25. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
1994] MEDICAL MONITORING 367 
III. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA 
A. Generally 
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA28 as a comprehensive response 
and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems 
associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites.29 Con-
gress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
of 197630 to address the problem of monitoring and tracking hazardous 
wastes to fill the gaps in existing environmental protection measures 
for air and water.31 RCRA proved inadequate to deal with the increas-
ing costs and personnel needs associated with the cleanup of aban-
doned hazardous waste sites.32 CERCLA was passed to remedy these 
deficiencies and to address the increasing health and environmental 
problems associated with existing hazardous wastes.33 
CERCLA's objectives are the prompt and efficient cleanup of haz-
ardous waste sites and the placement of ultimate financial responsi-
bility for that cleanup on those responsible for the waste.34 Recogniz-
ing the conflict between the urgency of cleanup needs and the 
time-consuming process of ascertaining the responsible parties, CER-
CLA created the $1.6 billion Hazardous Substance Response Trust 
Fund, known as the "Superfund."35 Although the Superfund was origi-
28 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). 
29 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 17-18 (1980). 
30 For further discussion of RCRA, see CHARLES OPENCHOWSKI, A GUIDE TO ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW IN WASHINGTON 9-14 (2d prtg. 1991). 
31 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-9691(i). See id.; Allan Kanner, Medical Monitoring: State and Federal 
Perspectives, 2 TuLANE ENVTL. L. J. 1, 5 (1989). 
32 See e.g., United States v. Northeastern Phannaceutical & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 836 
n.lO, 838-89 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (S.D. Ill. 
1984). 
33 See 126 CONGo REC. H11801 (daily ed., Dec. 3, 1980) (" ... [T]his bill attempts to deal with 
the problem of who pays for cleaning up the environmental mess we have created.") (remarks 
by Rep. Brown); OPENCHOWSKI, supra note 30, at 14; Kristian E. Anderson, Note, The Right 
to Response Costs Under CERCLA, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345, 345 (1985). 
34 See Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (citing Walls v. Waste 
Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982) (establishing Superfund); 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988) (current 
provision for Superfund). Much of the funding for the original Superfund was derived from 
excise taxes imposed on hazardous feedstock chemicals, as well as on crude oil and imported 
petroleum products. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4612, 4661, 4662, 4671 (1982) (Superfund revenue 
provisions amending Internal Revenue Code of 1954). General revenues provided the remainder 
of the necessary funding. See 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2) (1982). For further discussion of sources of 
Superfund revenues, see Elizabeth F. Mason, Note, Contribution, Contribution Protection, and 
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nally effective for only five years,36 Congressional amendments to 
CERCLA included the October, 1986 enactment of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),37 which simultane-
ously extended the life of the Superfund for another five years and 
increased its funding by $8.5 billion.38 While the EPA will, under some 
circumstances, allow responsible parties to conduct their own clean-
ups, the Superfund serves as interim funding for private or govern-
mental cleanups.39 Where responsible parties can be determined, mo-
nies expended in cleanup efforts are replaced through recovery 
actions against those parties.40 Where this is not possible, however, 
cleanup costs are spread through the Superfund's reliance on tax 
income.41 
B. Enforcement 
Enforcement of CERCLA generally takes one of two statutory 
routes: injunctive relief under section 9606 in cases of imminent and 
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare due to the 
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance,42 and section 
9607(a) cost recovery actions.43 A cost recovery action arises when the 
EPA uses the Superfund to respond to actual or threatened "re-
leases"44 of "hazardous substances"45 at a "facility."46 The EPA also 
may conduct "removal" and "remedial" actions,47 and any other re-
sponse measures deemed necessary to protect the public health, wel-
fare, and environment.48 
Once the EPA uses the Superfund to finance one of these actions, 
section 9607(a) permits the Agency to undertake an action against the 
Nonsettlor Liability Under CERCLA- Follawing Laskin's Lead, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
73, 79 n.34 (1991). 
36 See Mason, supra note 35, at 79. 
37Pub. L. No. 99-499,100 Stat. 1613 (primarily codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)). 
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 9611; 26 U.S.C. § 9507; Mason, supra note 35, at 80, note 41. 
39 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 934. 
40 See Leslie S. Gara, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using Common Sense and the Common 
Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 
279 (1988); id. at 932. 
41 See supra note 35. 
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
43 See id. § 9607(a). Section 9604 describes the EPA's response authorization. See id. § 9604. 
44 See id. § 9601(22). 
45 [d. § 9601(14). 
46 [d. § 9601(9). 
4742 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(24). 
48 [d. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
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parties responsible for the contamination for recovery of response 
costS.49 
The scheme controlled by sections 9606 and 9607 is complicated, 
however, by ambiguities in CERCLA's language, particularly its fail-
ure to define the "necessary costs of response" recoverable under 
section 9607. Drafted as a last-minute compromise,5° CERCLA is 
notorious for its lack of clarity,51 and section 9607-no exception to 
this rule-has required frequent judicial construction.52 With the in-
crease in the dollar amounts of liability determinations at Superfund 
sites, however, and the escalating number of response actions initi-
ated, the courts have given more attention to defining "response 
costs" in the section 9607 context. 53 
Section 9601 defines the term "response," standing alone, as "re-
move, removal, remedy, and remedial action."54 In turn, subsection 
(23) defines "remove" and "removal" as "cleanup or removal of re-
leased hazardous substances from the environment,"55 which commen-
tators generally interpret as encompassing short-term, or temporary 
elements of cleanup,56 while "remedy" and "remedial" as defined in 
subsection (24) apply to long-term and permanent solutions.57 In ad-
dition, although the statutory definitions in this section are admittedly 
"broadly drawn,"58 both subsections specifically include monitoring 
conducted in the interests of public health and welfare in their lists 
of examples of removal or remedial actions.59 
49 See id. § 9607(a). 
50 SUSAN M. COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY 
AND LITIGATION 14.01[1]14-13 (1992). See, infra, notes 197-249 and accompanying text. 
51 Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992). 
52 COOKE, supra note 50, § 14.01[1]14-14. 
53 See, e.g., Daigle, 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1179 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1988); Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (E.D. Pa. 1988); 
Williams v. Allied Automotive, 704 F. Supp. 782 (N .D. Ohio 1988); Wehner v. Syntex, 681 F. Supp. 
651 (N.D. Cal. 1987). See COOKE, supra note 50, § 14.01 [3][d] 14-M. 
54 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988). 
55 [d. § 9601(23). 
56 Specific examples include security fencing, alternative water supplies, and temporary 
evacuation and housing. [d. § 9601(24). 
57 Including containment actions, treatment/incineration and/or provision of alternative water 
supplies. [d. 
58 Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1429, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
59 Subsection (23) includes " ... such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and 
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances ... or the taking of such other 
actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or 
welfare or to the environment .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). Similarly, subsection (24) reads: 
"The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as ... any 
monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare 
and the environment." [d. § 9601(24). 
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C. Standards for Private Recovery: Section 107(a)(4)(B) 
While the EPA is responsible for the implementation of most CER-
CLA programs,60 and cleanups are frequently initiated by the govern-
ment,61 recovery actions under section 9607 are often initiated by 
private parties.62 Both governmental and private litigation regarding 
recovery of response costs center primarily on two issues: first, 
whether the plaintiffs must incur some cost prior to bringing suit; and 
second, whether particular expenditures warrant "response cost" 
status.63 The first issue is the simpler of the two: plaintiffs are gener-
ally permitted to bring suit as long as they have made at least some 
investment of their own.64 
The question of precisely what constitutes a "response cost" is more 
problematic. Section 9607 presents three threshold requirements for 
a finding of liability.65 First, the plaintiff must not be one of the parties 
potentially responsible for the contamination,66 a provision some 
courts read broadly to mean the plaintiff cannot be in the class of 
potentially responsible persons.67 Second, the response costs must be 
"necessary."68 Here, again, CERCLA's failure to define the term "nec-
essary" complicates the response cost debate.69 Finally, the costs must 
be consistent with the EPA-promulgated National Contingency Plan 
(NCP).70 Intended as a means to prevent wasteful or environmentally-
unsound response actions, the NCP is basically a procedural docu-
ment with few substantive criteria.71 While the NCP requires cleanup 
efforts to be cost-effective,72 its focus is more on the recoverability of 
various items of damages than the existence of a claim for relief,73 and 
it poses little problem for plaintiffs.74 Commentators have often 
60 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 934. 
61 See id. 
62 See COOKE, supm note 50, § 14.01[1] 14--11. 
63 See id. § 14.01[3][b] 14--22. 
64 See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1429, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
65 42 U .S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
66 [d. § 9607(a)(l)-(4). 
67 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 937. 
68 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
69 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 937. 
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B); 40 C.F.R. 300.700(c)(3)(i)-(ii) (1990). 
71 See COOKE, supra note 50, § 14.01[7][b] 14-160.10. Mason, however, is of the opinion that 
consistency with the NCP is likely to develop into a major issue in CERCLA actions as 
defendants seek to use the consistency requirements as a shield against government recovery 
of cleanup costs. [d. 
7242 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(7) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 300.430(f)(1)(ii)(D) (1990)). 
73 See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1429, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
74 Plaintiffs can take further comfort from the NCP's inherent flexibility: the plan requires 
only "substantial compliance with potentially applicable requirements," leaving the courts free 
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agreed with the lower court decisions in favor of including medical 
monitoring costs in recovery actions, arguing that a broad interpre-
tation of the ambiguous terms surrounding "response costs" defini-
tions would encourage private cleanup efforts.75 
D. Creation and Duties of the ATSDR 
CERCLA section 9604(i) creates the Agency for Toxic Substance 
and Disease Registry (ATSDR) within the U.S. Public Health Service 
for the purpose of studying the effects of hazardous substances on 
human health.76 The ATSDR was originally created to compile a na-
tional register of serious diseases or illnesses of persons exposed to, 
and of areas restricted as a consequence of, toxic substance contami-
nation, and to inventory the literature regarding the health effects of 
toxic substances.77 Additionally, the ATSDR was also charged with 
providing medical care and testing to exposed individuals in cases of 
public health emergencies caused or believed to have been caused by 
exposure to toxic substances.78 The ATSDR's medical care duties 
included periodic screenings and surveys to be conducted in the event 
of a public health emergency to determine the relationship between 
toxic substances and illnesses.79 SARA's enactment in 198680 expanded 
the ATSDR's responsibilities to include research on the impact of 
toxic chemicals on human health.8! Presently, in addition to the sur-
veys required in cases of public health emergencies, the ATSDR may 
also perform health assessments where physicians or other individu-
als provide information that persons have been exposed to a hazard-
ous substance and that a release of hazardous substances is the prob-
able source of that exposure.82 
Upon the completion of each health assessment, the ATSDR must 
provide the EPA and each affected state with the results of the 
testing, and any recommendations it feels warranted.83 Where the 
to make case-by-case determinations of the meaning of "substantial compliance." 55 Fed. Reg. 
8666, 8793-94 (Mar. 8, 1990). Additionally, the 1986 amendments to CERCLA limited judicial 
review of these determinations. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j). CERCLA's stringent cleanup standards, 
articulated in § 121(aHd) further impair challenges to EPA cleanups. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(aHd). 
75 See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of 
Action Under CERCLA, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181,215 (1986). 
76 See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d] 13-36.13; Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 935. 
77 See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d] 13-36.13. 
78 See id. § 13.0l[ 4][d] 13-36.13. 
79 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(4) & (5) (1988). 
80 See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d] 13-36.13; Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 935. 
81 See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d] 13-36.14; Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 935. 
82 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(B). See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d] 13-36.14. 
83 See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d] 13-36.14. 
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assessment indicates that an actual or threatened release of hazard-
ous material has the potential to pose a serious threat to human health 
or the environment, the ATSDR must notify the EP A.84 The EPA then 
becomes responsible for conducting an evaluation of the threat or 
release in order to determine whether the site in question warrants 
placement on the National Priority List (NPL), or if the site is already 
listed, whether it should be accorded higher priority.85 
Additionally, where health assessment study data indicates further 
inquiry would be appropriate, section 9604(i)(7) requires the ATSDR 
to conduct a pilot study of health effects for selected groups of ex-
posed individuals.86 Based on the results of the initial health assess-
ment, this pilot study determines the need for full-scale studies.87 In 
the event that a full-scale study reveals a significant excess of disease 
in the population, the ATSDR must present the EPA with a letter of 
transmittal including its assessment of possible explanations other 
than the release prompting the initial investigation.88 Subsequently, if 
the study demonstrates hazardous substance exposure showing "sig-
nificant risk to human health," the EPA is required to take the nec-
essary steps to reduce the exposure and mitigate or eliminate the 
health risk. 89 
Although effective where it is authorized to act, the ATSDR is 
limited by the scope of its charter.90 It is effective where the site in 
question has been targeted and is listed on the NPL, but is essentially 
helpless to deal with smaller or less flagrantly contaminated loca-
tions.91 Further, any effort by the ATSDR to use health conditions as 
a gauge for monitoring or assessing the spread and impact of toxic 
contaminants on a long-range basis is hobbled by its restriction to 
short-term responses.92 While the ATSDR may conduct medical sur-
veillance of unspecified duration as part of an assessment where it 
finds a "significant increased risk of adverse health effects in hu-
mans,''93 this is not its focus. Additionally, although treatment is obvi-
84 See id. § 13.01[4][d] 13-36.14-36.15. 
85 42 U .S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(H). See id. § 13.01 [ 4][d] 13-36.14-'J6.15. 
86 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(7). 
87 See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d] 13-'J6.15. 
88 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (i)(7)(B). See id. § 13.01[4][d] 13-'J6.15. 
89 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1l). See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d] 13-'J6.15. CERCLA empow-
ers the ATSDR to delegate these responsibilities to states and their political subdivisions where 
the ATSDR finds them capable of carrying them out. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(15). 
90 Defined at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(i)(1)-{3), (5)-{6) and 9605(a)(8)(A). See Tanenbaum, supra note 
4, at 935. 
91 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 935. 
92 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)-{9); Gara, supra note 40, at 302. 
93 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(9). See Gara, supra note 40, at 303. 
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ously necessary in cases of human exposure to toxic substances, it is 
not the purpose of the ATSDR, an agency designed primarily for 
information-gathering,94 to bear the responsibility for providing indi-
vidual health care. 
CERCLA was enacted as an effort to arrest and ameliorate the 
vast problems presented by hazardous waste sites, especially those 
areas which RCRA failed to address.95 This endeavor was financed 
through creation of the Superfund, backing private and governmental 
cleanup actions.96 Although CERCLA authorizes recovery of "re-
sponse costs" under section 9607,97 it fails to define the term "response 
cost" in context.98 Working through CERCLA's text, however, using 
the drafters' original purposes as a guide, makes inclusion of public 
health-oriented monitoring in the category of potential response costs 
at least a plausible option.99 The question remains, however, of how 
best to take advantage of this option. Although the ATSDR was given 
responsibility for gathering information, and could conduct some 
monitoring toward this end, monitoring is not its primary purposeYlO 
As the ATSDR does not conduct medical monitoring in all CERCLA 
cleanups,t°l and arguably is not equipped to do so in its present form,too 
we must look for another solution. 
IV. MEDICAL MONITORING IN THE COURTS 
A Generally 
Medical monitoring---conducting surveys or studies to determine 
the effects of hazardous substance contamination on human health-is 
a controversial aspect of CERCLA response cost actions. While the 
single appellate decision to date on the subject ruled against such 
monitoring,too lower courts are split on the issue.104 One of the central 
94 See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d][vi]. 
96 See supra notes 30 and 33. 
96 See supra note 37. 
m See supra note 7. 
9B See supra notes 8 and 9. 
99 See supra note 14. 
100 See COOKE, supra note 50, at § 13.01[4][d][vi]. 
101 See supra note 92. 
102 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 935. 
103 See generally Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992). 
104 Cases supporting medical monitoring claims include: In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 
916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom General Electric Co. v. Knight, 113 L.Ed. 2d 
649, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); Lykins v. Westinghouse, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,498 
(E.D. Ky. 1988); Williams v. Allied Autamotive, 704 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1988); Brewer v. 
Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Ayers v. Jackson 'Ibwnship, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987). 
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reasons for this controversy is disagreement over the charac-
terization of the term "medical monitoring ."105 Generally, the courts 
disapprove of medical monitoring where the term is interpreted to 
mean health assessments made with a view to the treatment of indi-
vidual plaintiffs.loo There are two primary reasons for this: first, the 
courts often view this type of cost recovery as an attempt by plaintiffs 
to recover costs under the tort system before the costs are actually 
incurred,107 and second, the courts have difficulty reconciling individ-
ual treatment with the public health focus of CERCLNs languagey»l 
B. Tort Law Considerations 
The primary tort law difficulty in medical monitoring suits is that 
latent harm has, by definition, no immediate signs-that is, initially, 
there is nothing obviously wrong with the plaintiff. In order to re-
cover under tort law, the plaintiff must generally suffer demonstrable 
injury, such as detectable disease.109 Where this is not possible, as in 
the case of injury in the form of latent disease, the courts are hesitant 
to create a new cause of action.no The logical alternative, waiting to 
file suit until the onset of a present injury, is both unwise and often 
Cases opposed include: Daigle, 972 F.2d 1527; Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692 
(D. Kan. 1991); Woodman v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Ambrogi v. Gauld, 
Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 
1990), vacated, claim dismissed, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 
F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Coburn v. Sun Chemical Carp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 
(E.D. Pa. 1988); Wehner v. Syntex Carp., 681 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
106 See, e.g., Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1534-35. 
106 See id. at 1535 (medical monitoring would help individual plaintiffs, but would not further 
CERCLA's public health objectives); Woodman, 764 F. Supp. at 1469 (Brewer limited its holding 
to costs for public in general and not for individual treatment); Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1247 
(plaintiffs' medical costs do not serve the interests of public health and are therefore not 
recoverable as response costs under CERCLA). 
1(17 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 928. For a more comprehensive discussion of this subject, 
see generally David G. Posten, Note, Gone Thday and Here 7bmorrow: Damage Recovery for 
Subsequent Developing Latent Diseases in 7bxic 7brt Exposure Actions, 14 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADvoc. 159 (1990). 
1M See generally Allan T. Slagel, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate 
Compensation of 7bxic 7brt Victims, 24 TRIAL, Oct. 1988, at 44. 
109 See id. 
110 See Albert H. Parnell et al., Medical Monitoring: a Dangeraus Trend, 34 FOR THE DE-
FENSE, Apr. 1992, at 8; id. Additionally, Posten describes the dilemma faced by many plaintiffs 
regarding the possibility of latent injury: many jurisdictions require that all injuries-past, 
present, and future-be alleged in the complaint under penalty of possible estoppel; the so-called 
"all or nothing rule" may deny the plaintiff recovery for future illness unless she can prove that 
the likelihood the injury will occur is more probable than not. Posten, supra note 107, at 16~. 
The Chief Justice of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York describes 
the difficulty courts have in making decisions before all information is in: "We must rule within 
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impossible due to the potentially prohibitive effect of statutes of 
limitation, statutes of repose, causation problems and the like.1l1 The 
courts do not always find these obstacles insurmountable, however. 
Despite these difficulties, some courts have awarded damages in cases 
alleging environmental impact through contaminated ambient air, soil 
and groundwater,t12 often by holding that exposure .to toxic sub-
stances is, in itself, a compensable injury.u3 
C. Reconciling CERCLA and Medical Monitoring 
1. Generally 
Fortunately for plaintiffs, CERCLA's drafting employs means 
other than the tort principles traditionally relied upon to support 
liability in pollution suits.1l4 Consequently, in deciding on medical 
monitoring questions, the courts most often struggle with the com-
patibility of medical monitoring with CERCLA's problematic lan-
guagey5 Where the courts object to medical monitoring claims, they 
generally cite as their basis either monitoring's perceived inconsis-
tency with CERCLA's language or difficulties in reconciling the facts 
of various monitoring cases with CERCLA's explicitly public focus.u6 
In addition to examining the statute's text, proponents of both sides 
of the argument look to CERCLA's extensive legislative history for 
support.l17 Given the six years of discussion preceding CERCLA's 
a short time after a claim is brought, whether or not all the evidence has been developed-by 
long term population studies, for example." Chief Justice Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of the 
Court in 1bxic 1brt Litigation, 73 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1389 (1985). 
111 See Slagel, supra note 108, at 44. 
112 See Parnell et al., supra note 110, at 7. 
113 Unfortunately, this approach has had only limited success. See Slagel, supra note 108, at 
49. 
114 For a more comprehensive analysis of CERCLA liability, see generally Mason, supra note 
35. 
115 See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992). 
116 See, e.g., Woodman V. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467, 1470 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (Brewers 
holding limited to costs for public, not for individual treatment); Bolin V. Cessna Aircraft Co., 
759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing and corroborating criticism of CERCLA's failure to 
satisfactorily define "response costs"); Ambrogi V. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1247-48 (M.D. 
Pa. 1990) (medical monitoring not within the scope of section 9601's language.) 
117 See, e.g., Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535--36 (Congress considered medical monitoring, but rejected 
it before CERCLA's passage); Brewer V. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) 
(monitoring conducted in the interests of the public health acceptable although legislative 
history shows medical monitoring for the purposes of private treatment and diagnoses was 
rejected). 
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passage,tlS legislative history is a fertile, albeit ambiguous, area for 
argument. 
2. Arguments Against Medical Monitoring 
The courts are particularly hesitant to accept medical monitoring 
claims where the parties' interpretation of "medical monitoring" is 
broad enough to encompass a variety of observation and treatment 
costS.119 Such a reading not only tests the courts' ability and willing-
ness to read into statutory language, it also forces them to attempt 
to rationalize the inclusion of costs which may favor individual plain-
tiffs over the general welfare for which CERCLA was designed.120 
Given CERCLNs preoccupation with eliminating and preventing 
threats posed to public health by toxic substances,t21 some courts are 
reluctant to pay for monitoring when it appears the costs arose from 
individual treatment.122 
The Tenth Circuit in Daigle v. Shell Oil Co. found the costs of 
long-term health surveillance unrecoverable under section 107(a).123 
Here, plaintiffs attempted to recover costs of monitoring conducted 
to detect the onset of any latent disease, the onset of which was likely 
precipitated by the plaintiffs' exposure to hazardous materials.124 
While acknowledging the ability of this kind of diagnostic monitoring 
to assist individual plaintiffs, the court felt this narrow benefit base 
was incompatible with CERCLNs public health focus125 and was con-
ducted too late in the cleanup process to be considered a means of 
preventing contact between the public and a toxic release.l26 Similarly, 
the court in Woodman v. United States emphasized that even the 
pro-monitoring court in Brewer v. Ravan limited its holding to exclude 
diagnostic monitoring.127 
The fate of a given medical monitoring claim is often unclear at the 
outset of a particular suit. Where claims fail, however, they usually 
118 For further discussion of the legislative process behind CERCLNs passage, see generally 
SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Helen C. Needham & Mark Henefee eds. 2d prtg. 1985); 
infra notes 198-249 and accompanying text. 
119 See, e.g., Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535; Woodman, 764 F. Supp. at 1470. 
100 See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535; Woodman, 764 F. Supp. at 1470. 
121 See, e.g., Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1237. 
122 See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1992); Woodman v. United States, 
764 F. Supp. 1467, 1470 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
123 See 972 F.2d at 153l. 
124 See id. at 153~33. 
126 See id. at 1535. 
126 See id. 
127 See Woodman, 764 F. Supp. at 1470. 
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do so for one of a finite number of reasons, nearly all of which are 
bolstered with reminders that CERCLA was not enacted as a pana-
cea for hazardous waste damage, and encouraging remarks regarding 
the increased availability of non-traditional tort remedies.128 Aside 
from the larger issue of public health versus private treatment out-
lined above, one of the most common reasons medical monitoring suits 
fail, and one of the most difficult to counter in a satisfactory way, is 
the fact that medical monitoring is not explicitly named in CERCLA 
itself.l29 
While acknowledging CERCLA's lack of clarity,130 courts are often 
uneasy about allowing claims for monitoring when such monitoring is 
not specifically included in the statute's plain language. l3l This concern 
is exemplified in Coburn v. Sun Chemical COrp.,l32 the seminal case 
opposing medical monitoring suits, and its progeny.l33 Explicitly dis-
agreeing with the Brewer decision,134 the Coburn court held that 
medical monitoring does not qualify as a necessary cost of response 
under CERCLA, even where the monitoring is conducted in the 
interests of public health.135 In making this determination, the court 
relied heavily upon the absence of any explicit mention of medical 
monitoring in CERCLA itself.136 Acknowledging that both sections 
9601(23) and (24) provide specific examples of removal and remedial 
actions,137 but fail to mention medical monitoring per se, the Coburn 
court opted not to examine CERCLA's language in the context of its 
legislative history.l38 Dismissing the discussion surrounding CER-
CLA's hasty passage as unhelpful,139 the court clung to standard statu-
tory interpretation methods.140 Although nothing in CERCLA iden-
128 See Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
129 See id. at 1247. 
130 See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992); Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft 
Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991). 
131 See, e.g., Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1247. 
132 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BN A) 1665 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
133 See Bolin, 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D. 
Pa. 1990). 
134 See 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BN A) at 1670. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. at 1670. 
137 See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir. 1992); Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 
1247. 
138 See 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1667. 
139 See id. Other courts, particularly Ambrogi, have cited the legislative history discussion in 
Coburn as the weakest link in the argument opposing medical monitoring. Ambrogi v. Gould, 
Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1246 n. 16 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
140 See Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 1667 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
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tifies the subsection (23) or (24) lists of examples as exhaustive,141 the 
Coburn court declined the opportunity to make such a determination 
in the context of CERCLA's confusing history.142 A space exists into 
which medical monitoring could fit; the question facing the courts is 
whether or not it should. 
Another source of concern for some courts, including the Coburn 
court, is the potential for overlap between medical monitoring and the 
functioning of the ATSDR.143 Courts expressing this concern feel that 
the existence of the ATSDR and its ability to provide some limited 
coverage of medical treatment and observation further invalidate 
medical monitoring claims by individual plaintiffs.144 Proponents of 
this argument, including the courts in Daigle, Coburn and Ambrogi, 
contend the ATSDR's creation shows Congress' intention to limit 
permissible attention to human health as it relates to toxic substance 
emissions to consideration by this agency.145 Under section 9604(i)(4), 
the ATSDR is empowered to conduct tissue sampling, chromosomal 
testing and epidemiological studies, as well as any other assistance 
appropriate under the circumstances.146 Additionally, as the Coburn 
court points out, provision for medical testing under the auspices of 
the ATSDR is further distinguished from other medical monitoring 
claims by CERCLA's separation of the ATSDR from other liability 
provisions.147 
Judicial ambivalence on the issue of medical monitoring as part of 
recoverable "response costs" is further complicated by courts' uncer-
tainty regarding the propriety of awarding costs for future dam-
ages.148 This is particularly true where those costs do not appear 
tailored to preventing continued or future contact between the public 
and toxic releases.149 Courts' sympathy regarding plaintiffs adversely 
141 See generally 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675. See Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1247 (lists not exhaus-
tive, but provide template with which proposed response costs should be consistent). 
142 See Coburn, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1667-68. 
143 See id. at 1670; Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 713 (D. Kan. 1991). 
144 See Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1248-49; Chaplin v. Exxon, 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2009 
(S.D. Tex. 1986). 
145 See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1536 (10th Cir. 1992); Coburn, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BN A) at 1670; Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1249 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(4), (5)(A) (1988). 
147 See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537; Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1665, 1670 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Chaplin, 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2012. 
148 See Woodman v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Ambrogi, 750 F. 
Supp. at 1248. See Slagel, supra note 108, at 44. 
149 See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535; Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1248. 
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affected by hazardous substances does not allow them to justify 
granting costs for medical monitoring they see as back door routes to 
the recovery of the costs of personal treatment or individual diagno-
sesyj() 
A final concern for many courts facing medical monitoring claims is 
the compatibility of such claims with both of CERCLA's purposes: 
even if medical monitoring provides for the public health, some courts 
question its ability to facilitate hazardous substance cleanup.151 The 
question at issue in this particular debate is the legitimate duration 
and scope of a "cleanup." To courts opposing the inclusion of monitor-
ing, like that in Ambrogi/52 acceptable cleanups are those focused on 
the "removal" of a particular site of a particular contaminant.l53 Where 
this is not possible, as in the case of detrimental human exposure to 
hazardous substances, awarding response costs is inappropriate.l54 At 
least some courts have taken comfort from the apparent ease of 
matching hazardous waste problems with an "appropriate" remedy 
based on its timeframe. As the Ambrogi court laid its scheme out, 
CERCLA should be restricted to the remediation of past damage, 
while RCRA is the proper vehicle for present problems.l55 The flaw 
in this type of reasoning is not factual error, since these are appropri-
ate ways of dealing with the stated problems, but rather, incomplete-
ness. While CERCLA might not have been intended as a cure-all for 
hazardous substance contamination/56 it appears shortsighted to con-
ceive of CERCLA as a mere dustpan, idle until something is broken. 
3. Arguments in Favor of Medical Monitoring 
For the courts which have held medical monitoring costs to be at 
least potentially recoverable as response costs under section 9607, the 
critical factor is the courts' ability, given the facts of a particular case, 
to characterize the monitoring as something other than reimburse-
ment for treatment costS.157 CERCLA was envisioned and designed 
primarily as a system for public, not private protection.15s Accordingly, 
150 See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535. 
151 See Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 713 (D. Kan. 1991). 
152 See Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1250 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
153 See id. at 1246-47. 
154 See id. at 1250. 
155 See id. at 1247-48. 
156 See id. at 1248. 
157 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 939. 
158 See id. at 925. 
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to qualify as a response cost, medical monitoring must be more than 
repayment for personal harms.l59 Thus, the most successful cases have 
been those following the standard enumerated in Brewer v. Ravan, 160 
where medical monitoring of human health is used to assess the 
effects of hazardous waste on the public and environment.161 
Under this "public welfare objective" test, courts' acknowledgment 
of CERCLA's failure to explicitly include medical monitoring does not 
doom the decision-making processYl2 While remedies for individuals 
are beyond CERCLA's scope, the Act permits private actions for the 
protection of the environment and the health of the population at 
largeyl3 To the extent that plaintiffs can characterize medical testing 
and monitoring as necessary to assess the extent or effect of a release 
of hazardous substances, courts like that in Brewer164 have held the 
costs of those activities recoverable.l65 
U sing the public welfare approach, rather than the tic list favored 
by many courts opposing medical monitoring recoveries,l66 allows 
CERCLA to be applied more consistently. While a tic list leaves room 
for the exercise of some judicial discretion in examining monitoring 
claims, a given claim may be doomed by its failure to meet a particular 
criterion in a satisfactory way. Using the public welfare objective test 
cannot guarantee perfectly just results. Nevertheless, as cases like 
Brewer demonstrate, this test allows judges to hinge their decisions 
on the fit between the purposes of the monitoring effort and CER-
CLA's objectives. In doing so, the test prevents claims from failing on 
the basis of relative technicalities, and eliminates the temptation for 
judges to circumvent an existing standard in order to achieve a just 
result. 
159 See id. at 930. 
160 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
161 See id. 
162 See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 
F. Supp. 1176, 1179--80 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
163 See Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. ; COOKE, supra note 50, at 14-{i6. 
166 See, e.g., Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 1671 (E.D. Pa. 
1988) (finding medical monitoring does not assist in monitoring or evaluating a release); Wood-
man v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (adopting Coburn analysis 
regarding CERCLA response costs); Chaplin v. Exxon Co., 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2009, 
2012 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (finding medical care provisions of CERCLA separate from liability 
provisions, rendering medical monitoring costs unrecoverable); Wickland Oil Terminals v. 
Asarco, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 72, 77-78 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, in part, appeal dismissed, in part, 
792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. Cal. 1986) (costs of response must be incurred in order for parties to have 
standing to seek relief under CERCLA). 
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Despite opposition concerns,167 pro-monitoring decisions do not 
strain the text of section 9601. Rather, pro-monitoring courts inter-
pret the plain meaning of the text of subsections (23) and (24) guided 
by CERCLA's purposes: facilitating the prompt cleanup of hazardous 
waste facilities and placing the ultimate financial burden on the re-
sponsible parties.l68 This reading emphasizes the crucial difference 
between public health and personal injury and disease,169 but does not 
call the legitimacy of public purpose monitoring into question yo By 
emphasizing the public focus of informational medical monitoring, the 
distinction also relieves pressure on the courts to step in and delineate 
the role of the ATSDR. Leaving treatment-oriented action and sur-
veillance to the ATSD R, and allowing informational monitoring to be 
conducted independently at least reduces the need for concern re-
garding competition between the two systems. Particularly given at 
least one court's discomfort with the EPA's experience in handling 
long-term responses,171 judicial approval of this kind of system seems 
likely. 
While there is no definitive and universally-accepted answer re-
garding the recoverability of claims for future damages, the judiciary 
as a whole is clearly unwilling to allow the door to close on the 
permissibility of recovery for such claims.l72 Although claims for fu-
ture costs receive particularly favorable attention where plaintiffs can 
show that at least part of the costs have already been paid,173 such 
expenditures are not universally required. In considering such pro-
spective costs, the courts take the appropriate step of allowing CER-
CLA to overlay tort considerations, mending a previously unforesee-
able gap in the law.174 
Finally, courts supporting medical monitoring claims have not 
found it difficult to see how such monitoring furthers CERCLA 
167 See Coburn, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1670. 
168 Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), citing Walls v. Waste Resource 
Corp., 761 F. Supp. 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985). 
169 While medical treatment serves personal injury, medical monitoring serves the public as a 
whole. See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 929. 
170 See id. at 929-30. 
171 See Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1359 (D. Del. 
1985). 
172 See Williams v. Allied Automotive, 704 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N .D. Ohio 1988); Jones v. Inmont 
Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1429, 1429-30 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
173 See Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179. 
174 See, e.g., id. (finding public health-related tests clearly necessary to evaluate and assess 
releases); Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
2119,2121 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (finding costs of identifying and allaying environmental problems 
associated with hazardous waste releases clearly removal costs under section 9601(23)). 
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cleanup actions.175 While some courts are more hesitant than others 
to give unconditional support to monitoring's status as an acceptable 
cost of response,176 those accepting monitoring have had little 
difficulty identifying and supporting monitoring's role in CERCLA 
cleanups.177 The clearest articulation of this reaction comes from the 
court in Velsicol Chemical Corp.l78 In upholding a claim for investiga-
tive costs,179 the Velsicol court stated, "[i]t is difficult to see how costs 
of identifying and determining how to allay the environmental prob-
lem ... are not subsumed within the definition of response costS."180 
This characterization clarifies the role of medical monitoring in fur-
thering CERCLA's efforts to control and prevent toxic releases,l8l 
finding that the statutory definition of "removal" contemplates track-
ing actions to determine the need for removal of contaminants and 
protection of the public.182 
Courts' ability to reconcile the facts regarding medical monitoring 
in individual cases with CERCLA's frustratingly vague language 
demonstrates the extent to which these courts have found public 
health-oriented monitoring consistent with CERCLA's purpose.183 Ac-
knowledging the elusive nature of a comprehensive definition of the 
175 See, e.g., Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179; Velsicol Chemical Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 2121; 
infra note 176. 
176 See Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179 (informational monitoring to assess effect of hazardous 
substance release on the public qualifies as response cost); Williams v. Allied Automotive, 704 
F. Supp. 782, 784 (N .D. Ohio 1988) (future medical monitoring costs not categorically unrecov-
erable as response costs); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1429, 1429--30 (S.D. Ohio 1984) 
(definition of ''response'' is broadly drawn and would be premature to say medical testing does 
not qualify). 
177 See Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179; Velsicol Chemical Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 
212l. 
178 Velsicol Chemical Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BN A) at 2119. 
179 The court defined these costs as "monies, time and efforts expended in order to identify 
the problem and determine how the problem can best be allayed." See id. at 212l. 
18) See id. 
181 See Williams, 704 F. Supp. at 784; Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1429. 
182 See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1429, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984). Although the issue of 
recovery for recovery of future costs has not been heartily endorsed, at least one court has 
refused to exclude it entirely. Williams v. Allied Automotive, 704 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D. Ohio 
1988). 
1&1 See, e.g., Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Williams, 704 F. Supp. 
at 784 (statutory definition of "remove" clearly contemplates "such actions as are reasonably 
necessary to making a reasoned determination of whether physical removal of hazardous con-
taminants is necessary in a given situation."); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 628 
F. Supp. 391, 406 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (costs of activities useful and necessary to the formulation of 
proposed remedy are conceivably recoverable as part of the response costs for the remedy); 
Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370, 376 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 
1429--30. 
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response costs identified in section 9607(a),t84 courts have nonetheless 
found that public health related medical tests and screenings are 
necessary to "monitor, assess [or] evaluate a release" and so consti-
tute removal and remedial action under subsections (23) and (24).185 
As both removal and remedial actions are parts of "response" as 
defined in section 9601(25), these testing and screening costs may be 
recoverable under section 9607(a),t86 at least to the extent that plain-
tiffs seek recovery of monitoring costs for the purpose of protecting 
the public health by identifying and assessing health problems emerg-
ing from releases.l87 
Medical monitoring is presently a controversial topic in the courts, 
and the outcome of cases concerning the recoverability of monitoring 
costs under CERCLA are difficult to predict.188 A first hurdle for 
pro-monitoring plaintiffs is often judicial reluctance to award dam-
ages in the absence of some demonstrable harm.189 Fortunately, CER-
CLA provides alternatives to recovery under tort law.190 While this 
permits plaintiffs to avoid the obstacle of tort principles, however, 
monitoring's proponents must still struggle to persuade courts to 
wade through CERCLA's notoriously problematic language dealing 
with response costS.191 Where courts see medical monitoring as pri-
marily concerned with the treatment and/or diagnosis of particular 
individuals, as the court did in Daigle v. Shell Oil CO.,192 they are 
generally unable to reconcile the plaintiffs' claims with CERCLA's 
explicitly public health and welfare orientation.1OO These courts are 
also often simultaneously concerned with using judicial power to pro-
mote CERCLA's encroachment into the realm of the established 
ATSDR.194 Where, however, courts can find public health benefits 
resulting from plaintiffs' medical monitoring, as did the court in 
184 Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp.1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
185 See id. 
186 See id.; Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1429. 
187 See Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1179; Williams, 704 F. Supp. at 784 (statutory definition of 
"remove" clearly contemplates "such actions as are reasonably necessary to making a reasoned 
determination of whether physical removal of hazardous contaminants is necessary in a given 
situation."); Conservation Chemical Co., 628 F. Supp. at 406 (costs of activities useful and 
necessary to the formulation of proposed remedy are conceivably recoverable as part of the 
response costs for the remedy); Adams, 621 F. Supp. at 376; Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1429-S0 . 
. 188 See supra note 94 and 104. 
189 See generally Slagel, supra note 108. 
190 See supra note 114. 
191 See supra note 130. 
192 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992). 
193 See supra note 104. 
194 See supra note 145. 
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Brewer v. Ravan,195 they often find the monitoring efforts recoverable 
for its public health benefits, and for its ability to promote and further 
CERCLA cleanup actionsYJ6 
V. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
As passed on December 11, 1980, CERCLA was a last-minute 
revision of a measure first approved by the House of Repre-
sentatives.lITl In its urgency to acquire sufficient support in both 
houses to pass a hazardous wastes law before the close of Carter's 
presidency, Congress effected a number of drastic political compro-
mises198 whose practical effects proved extensive. No committee re-
port accompanied the Senate's revisions of the proposal, and the 
House had little opportunity to discuss them.199 The bill was offered 
on an all-or-nothing basis, and over clamorous objections, Congress 
took it.2°O 
A. The Major Bills 
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976 (RCRA) to respond to the problems created by escalating haz-
ardous waste production.201 Specifically, RCRA was designed to pro-
tect health and the environment and to conserve valuable material 
and energy resources by regulating the disposal of toxic substances.202 
Although effective on a limited scale,203 RCRA proved inadequately 
funded and staffed to fulfill its purposes. Recognizing the need for a 
more comprehensive and better-funded plan,204 both the House and 
Senate proposed bills to this end. Four major bills emerged from these 
proposals: S. 1341, S. 1480, H.R. 85, and H.R. 7020.206 Although none 
of these bills was adopted into law, they provide background on the 
lengthy process that ultimately yielded CERCLA.206 
196 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
196 See supra note 104. 
1!11 COOKE, supra note 50, at 12-12. 
HiS See id.; Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 930. 
199 See COOKE, supra note 50, at 12-12. 
200 See id. 
201 See David A. Rich, Comment, Personal Liallility for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: an Ex-
amination of CERCLA § 107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 643, 646 (1986). 
200 See id. at 647. 
200 See id. at 649. 
204 See id. at 650. 
2m See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xiii. 
2m CERCLA as passed in 1980 was a compromise first presented on the floor of the Senate. 
See id. 
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H.R. 85 was introduced by Representative Mario Biaggi on January 
15, 1979.207 As proposed, H.R. 85 created two funds, one for oil spills, 
and one to cover spills of certain hazardous substances into navigable 
waters, to be funded by various tax revenues.208 The measure also 
provided for a scheme of strict joint and several liability, and included 
liability for both governmental and private costs and injuries result-
ing from discharges of hazardous substances.209 
H.R. 7020, presented on April 2, 1980 and sponsored primarily by 
Representative James Florio, was designed to address the increasing 
health and environmental problems associated with hazardous waste 
dumpsites.21o As passed by the House, the bill imposed strict liability, 
as well as joint and several liability for both governmental and spe-
cified private damages, and authorized the government to respond to 
dangerous releases of hazardous substances, or threats of such re-
leases, at abandoned and inactive waste sites.211 The plan was financed 
by the establishment of a $600 million Hazardous Waste Response 
Fund to be derived in equal shares from government appropriations 
and from fees on petroleum and petrochemical products of various 
kinds.212 As discussed below, while the House bill died in the Senate, 
the bill's number did not.213 
Senator John Culver introduced S. 1341 on June 14, 1979.214 As 
proposed, this measure established a $1.6 billion fund taken from 
government appropriations and fees imposed on oil, chemical feeds, 
and inorganic substances.215 S. 1341 proposed a system of strict and 
207 See id. at xiii. After its introduction, the bill was referred to the Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, and subsequently, to subcommittee. [d. at xiv. After the addition of 
multiple amendments, H.R. 85 was reported to the full House on June 20 with report No. 96-172, 
Part 3. [d. at xiv. Probably as a result of opposition by the oil and chemical industry to the bill's 
industry liability provisions, this revision by the Ways and Means Committee was not consid-
ered by the full House. [d. A substitute, however, developed by Rep. John Breaux, apparently 
reduced industry opposition; this substitute was taken up by the Committee of the Whole on 
September 18 and 19. [d. 
208 See id. 
209 The House passed the bill to the Senate, where it died after referral to the Senate 
Committee on the Environment and Public Works. See id. 
210 See 126 Congo Rec. 26, 337 (1980) (remarks by Reps. Florio and Staggers). After its 
introduction and referral to various committees, H.R. 7020 Ultimately was referred to and 
agreed upon by the Committee of the Whole. See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xv. 
211 See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xv-xvi. 
212 See id. at xv. After enactment by the House, the measure went on to the Senate and its 
committee on the Environment and Public Works. See id. at xvi. Although neither this commit-
tee nor the Senate ever formally considered the bill in its house version, H.R. 7020 was compared 
to S. 1480 in Senate debate on the latter measure. See id. at xvi. 
213 See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xvi. 
214 See id. 
215 See id. 
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joint and several liability on owners and operators of polluting vessels 
and facilities operated on navigable waters.216 
S.1480 was introduced by Senators Culver and Edmund Muskie in 
early July, 1979, shortly after Senator Culver's introduction of S. 
134l,217 To assume liability for damages concerning certain closed 
hazardous waste disposal areas,218 the Senate's bill established a mul-
tibillion dollar fund, as well as making provision for imposition of strict 
joint and several liability on a spectrum of potentially liable parties, 
for both governmental and private damages, including medical ex-
penses.219 
B. The Emergence of CERCLA 
By November of 1980, it had become clear that none of the proposed 
bills would be bicamerally adopted as written.220 In order to pass a bill 
before the close of the 96th Congress-before the change of the party 
controlling the administration and the Senate-the Senate proposed 
two compromises.221 The first, Amendment 2622, proposed by Sena-
tors Stafford, Mitchell, et al. as a complete substitute for the substan-
tive provisions of S. 1480, was found unacceptable, and failed.222 The 
second proposal, however, the Stafford-Randolph Compromise intro-
duced on November 24,1980, met with great success.2Zl The measure 
216 See id. After its introduction, the bill was referred to the Subcommittees on Environmental 
Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public 
Works. See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xvi. The bill died in Senate after joint hearings with 
S. 1480 on June 21 and July 19 and 20, 1979. See id. 
217 See id. at xvii. The bill was referred to the Subcommittees on Environmental Pollution and 
Resource Protection, and while neither subcommittee produced a printed version of the 
amended bill, the whole committee did produce two preliminary versions of their revisions. See 
id. at xvii. On July 11, after the subcommittees' amended bill was forwarded to it for amendment, 
the full committee reported favorably on the bill to the Senate as a whole. See SUPERFUND, 
supra note 118, at xvii. 
218 See id. 
219 See id. at xvii-xviii. To facilitate findings of liability, the bill included presumptions of 
causation and modified evidentiary rules to be used in resulting litigation. See id. at xviii. So 
amended, S. 1480 was referred to the Senate Committee on Finance on October 10, 1980. See 
id. at xviii. Apparently intending to expedite the bill's floor consideration, the Committee 
reported it without amendment, recommendation, or written report on November 18, but the 
bill was never considered by the full Senate. See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xviii. 
2aJ See id. at xviii. Sen. Stafford felt that the failure of H.R. 85 and H.R. 7020 was due, at least 
in part, to the bills' narrow scope. See 126 CONGo REG. S14968 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement 
by Sen. Stafford). 
221 See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xviii. 
222 See id. at xviii-xix. 
222 See 126 CONGo REG. S14967-68 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (comments by Sen. Stafford and 
Sen. Randolph). 
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was passed the same day,224 with very little opportunity for discussion.225 
Immediately after passing on the Stafford-Randolph plan, the Senate 
took up H.R. 7020 as passed by the House.2ai The Senate struck all 
provisions of the existing H.R. 7020, inserted the Stafford-Randolph 
version of S. 1480 into the eviscerated House measure, and passed it 
by a voice vote.227 This Senate version of H.R. 7020 was then sent to 
the House, where it was taken up on December 3.228 Despite voluble 
protest, the Senate version was enacted by the House that day,229 and 
was signed into law by President Carter on December 11, 1980.200 
The Senate's priority in passing the CERCLA bill was a desire to 
protect the abstract concepts of public health and the environment, 
not personal health or property.221 Unfortunately, pressure to pass a 
bill furthering these interests within a limited timeframe precluded 
adequate discussion and consideration of its wording and provisions, 
and resulted in large-scale excisions of provisions which, had Con-
gress had more time, would have been examined in a much less 
cursory fashion, and would have been unlikely to have been con-
ceded.232 Both supporters of the bill223 and their opposition emphasized 
the need to view the bill as only the skeleton of a satisfactory law, 
224 See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xix. 
225 See Anderson, supra note 33, at 346. 
226 See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xxi. 
227 See id. at xxi. 126 CONGo REC. Sl5009 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). These procedural gymnastics 
were required because of the tax provisions in the bill; the Constitution requires revenue bills 
to originate in the House of Representatives. See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xxi. 
228 See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at xxi. 
229 See id. 
230 Pub. L. No. 96-510. 
231 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 931. 
232 For instance, S.1480 had provisions for private recovery of medical expenses, but deleted 
them in an effort to get bipartisan support. See id. at 927. 
Sen. Stafford admits the wholesale nature of the excisions in his comments on his own 
compromise: 
[I]n consideration of the urgent need for remedial legislation to respond to the prob-
lems caused by the release of chemical poisons into our environment, I am putting 
forward a compromise. This compromise incorporates those parts of S.1480, H.R.7020 
and H.R.85 on which there is broad consensus. Given the lateness of this session, it is 
my hope that this proposal will be an acceptable compromise for all concerned. 
126 CONGo REC. Sl4642 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1980) (remarks by Sen. Stafford). 
Additionally, Sen. Stafford points out omissions resulting from the bill's hasty passage: "Mr. 
President, there are elements of S.1480 that are not contained in this substitute bill. The 
provisions we have eliminated were those that generated considerable controversy, resulting in 
delay of Senate passage of S.1480." 126 CONGo REC. S14643 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1980) (remarks 
by Sen. Stafford). 
233 Since proponents are expected to understand their proposals, their explanatory statements 
are usually more important than those of opponents. See SUPERFUND, supra note 118, at ix. 
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requiring additional steps to insure the transition to an acceptable 
long-term means of dealing with hazardous wastes,234 Despite the 
substantial debate on whether the bill's imperfections should prevent 
its passage, Congress ultimately decided they should not,235 The re-
sult, CERCLA, was recognized as an unsatisfactory solution even at 
the time of its passage,236 but was passed on the belief that the issue 
had reached the point of "now or never," and that some action, even 
one as plainly slipshod as this, was preferable to the danger that 
subsequent Congresses would be unable to pass any measure at all. 237 
A provision for out-of-pocket medical expenses was just one of the 
victims of the wholesale excisions made in the interests of passing the 
bill under the wire,238 The debate, limited as it was by the time 
constraints imposed by the impending change in party power, cen-
tered on the effect of the compromises on the practical effects of the 
bill, and on the compatibility of those effects with the bill's overriding 
purpose,239 Both houses of Congress were frank in their acknow-
234 
Mr. Speaker, one Member in the other body who dislikes what we send back can kill 
the whole product. We have worked on this for 6 years. Let us be pragmatic and let 
us still be a little idealistic and say we have a product that while not perfect it is far 
better than what we have now, which is nothing. Vote for this now and next year we 
have commitment that the oilspill section will be addressed and will be taken care of. 
126 CONGo REC. H1l792 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks by Rep. Breaux). 
"I am not happy with this bill, but 1 would be far sadder if we did not pass it. We must begin. 
We must start." 126 CONGo REC. H1l793 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks by Rep. Gibbons). 
235 For examples of House debate surrounding the bill, see 126 CONGo REC. H11774-803 (daily 
ed. Dec. 3, 1980). 
236 "It is on the face of it a very, very bad bill." 126 CONGo REC. H1l793 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) 
(remarks by Rep. Roberts). 
237 "This compromise embodies concessions that 1 would otherwise not make. But 1 make the 
concessions because, even as we discuss the issue in this chamber, more chemical poisons are 
being released into our environment, threatening the health and well-being of present and 
future generations of Americans." 126 CONGo REC. S14642 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1980) (remarks by 
Sen. Stafford). 
"That text [the Stafford-Randolph compromise] will show that supporters of the legislation 
made some additional major concessions in the final effort to achieve a superfund bill this year." 
126 CONGo REC. S14967 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). 
"Certainly, if this bill goes back, it will never see the light of day. 1 say to this body, from my 
own practical experience, this is not a full loaf, but let us take what we can get .... " 126 CONGo 
REC. H11793 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks by Rep. Gibbons). 
"I regret this legislation is not perfect. Had we not taken so long in getting it through our 
deliberative processes, there might have yet been time to consider perfection; yet if we insist 
on changing it now with no time left to the Senate for concurrence, then the issue self-destructs 
before our very eyes." 126 CONGo REC. H1l797 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks by Rep. Martin). 
238 See 126 CONGo REC. S14967 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement by Sen. Stafford); 126 CONGo 
REC. S14973 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement by Rep. Mitchell). 
239 See 126 CONGo REC. SI4929-16428 (daily ed. Nov. 24--Dec. 12, 1980); 126 CONGo REC. 
H11773-12199 (daily ed. Dec. 3,1980). 
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ledgment of the fact that the most controversial portions of the bill 
were eliminated.240 Unsurprisingly, much of the eliminated material 
dealt with liability for damage and danger to human health.241 That 
excision of these portions of the original bills and subsequent compro-
mises facilitated passage of the sanitized bill in no way indicates that 
the changes were seen as improvements in any context other than the 
political.242 As time-consuming as Congress supposed the inclusion of 
private recovery provisions would be, individual members were out-
spoken in their belief that removal of those provisions not only evis-
cerated the bill, but rendered it inconsistent with its primary pur-
poses.243 While recognizing the importance of protecting natural 
resources given the known adverse effects of hazardous substances 
on human health,244 members of both the House and Senate were vocal 
about their dissatisfaction with a system that failed to address the 
effects of hazardous substances on people.245 
The Congressional concern regarding private recovery also encom-
passed debate on the inclusion of medical monitoring costs. Recogni-
tion in both Houses of the need to include health monitoring and 
surveillance in the hazardous substance context was backed by urging 
240 During Senate debate on the Stafford-Randolph substitution to s. 1480, Sen. Stafford 
conceded that the compromise eliminates "at least the most controversial" elements of the other 
three bills: "Frankly, it eliminates 75 percent of what we were seeking in S.1480. But knowing 
of the urgent need for legislation, we were willing to do that." 126 CONGo REC. S14967 (daily ed. 
Sept. 23, 1980) (statement by Sen. Stafford). 
241 For example, Rep. Oakar raised issues of health problems associated with dumping. 126 
CONGo REC. H9472 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (remarks by Rep. Oakar). 
242 See supra notes 232-241, infra notes 243-249 and accompanying text. 
243 "The guiding principle of those who wrote S.1480 was that those found responsible for harm 
caused by chemical contamination should pay for the costs of that harm. We are abandoning 
that principle here today when the damage involved is to a person." 126 CONGo REC. S14973 
(daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks by Sen. Mitchell). 
244 "As we all know, hazardous substances have wide-ranging effects including illness, birth 
defects, even death, as well as destruction of natural resources. Under S.1480, a party could be 
held responsible for those wide-ranging effects, specifically: ... Costs of expert witness fees, 
health studies, and diagnostic examinations." [d. 
245 "In this bill, we are telling the people of this country that under our value system a 
property interest is worth compensating but human life is not." [d. 
"N either logic nor compassion, good government nor commonsense compel this result. It is 
simply a failure of will on the part of Congress to deal with what is the most serious part of the 
problem-injuries to persons." [d. at S14974. 
The gentleman from New Jersey's view is that this version is identical to the House-
passed H.R. 7020. It is not. He even stated that the Senate added H.R.85's amendments 
to the Clean Water Act dealing with hazardous spills into navigable water-but he did 
not mention that they dropped H.R.85's third-party damages-the provisions that help 
people.-People have been left out of the bill before us today. Only things are covered. 
[d. at H11795 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks by Rep. Snyder). 
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from sources outside Congress.246 Both Congress and the outside 
sources recognized the need for legislation on hazardous waste 
cleanup, particularly given the courts' unwillingness to speak to the 
issue in a unified way.247 Congress was clear in its finding that studies 
conducted to determine the effects of hazardous substance contami-
nation would be relevant to proceedings involving claims for medical 
expenses.248 Further, despite Congress's priority in passing a bill at 
nearly any cost, there was specific objection to the removal of medical 
monitoring considerations.249 Although medical monitoring provisions 
fell to the sweeping expurgations undertaken to expedite CERCLA's 
hasty passage, they were neither disregarded nor eliminated on their 
merits. As the v'Olume of ensuing litigation demonstrates, while CER-
CLA passed without provision for monitoring, the value of the exclu-
sion was fleeting, at best. 
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
The confusion and inconsistency surrounding CERCLA response 
costs makes clear the need for a single, unified system of decision-
"The liability coverages are totally inadequate. They do not take care of people. They take 
care of cleanup and damages to natural resources and, as a consequence of that, the Federal 
preemption provision is deficient." [d. at H11796 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks by Rep. 
Snyder). In the words of Rep. Snyder during House debates on H.R. 7020 as amended by the 
Senate on December 3, 1980, many felt the compromise meant the bill did not do what citizens 
wanted it to do: "it does not help people .... " [d. at H11796 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). 
246 Evidence that Congress specifically contemplated provisions for medical monitoring, even 
though provisions were not included in final form, can be found in S. Rep. No. 848. SENATE 
COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
ACT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1980), reprinted in SUPERFUND, supra note 118, 
vol. I at 308. See Hearings on S.1480 Before the Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 664--65 
(1980) (written statement of John J. Sheehan, Legislative Director, United Steelworkers of 
America), reprinted in SUPERFUND, supra note 118, vol. I at 319-20 ("(1) specifically authorizes 
the admission of medical and scientific studies in courts of law including the results of animal 
studies, tissue studies, and microorganism studies which, in the past, have been excluded by 
some courts .... "). 
247 See Hearing on S.1341 and S.1480 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution and 
Resource Protection and Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 225 
(1979) (written statement on Peter H. Weiner, Special Assistant, Governor's Office, California), 
reprinted in SUPERFUND, supra note 118, vol. I at 320 ("It is vital that this bill attack this knotty 
problem in two ways. First, we urge substantial funding for epidemiological, laboratory, and 
field research to assess the human and environmental hazards posed by specific substances or 
specific sites."). 
248 See S. 1480 Staff Working Paper No.1, Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, § 4(c)(a)(A) (Feb. 1, 1980). 
249 "People are begging us not to weaken this bill. If anything, strengthening it with the Gore 
amendments, strengthen it with the amendments of the gentleman from Texas [Rep. Eckhardt] 
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making regarding these costS.250 There are two good possibilities for 
eliminating the confusion surrounding medical monitoring suits while 
simultaneously fulfilling CERCLNs purposes of facilitating cleanups 
and protecting human health: one relies upon the judiciary; the other, 
on the legislature. As a preliminary measure, both options require a 
clear standardization of the definition of medical monitoring. That 
definition should be the monitoring of long-term human health condi-
tions in communities affected or suspected of being affected by haz-
ardous substance contamination, where such monitoring is used as an 
information-gathering tool to track the contamination's spread and 
effects. While each individual's need for medical care after exposure 
to toxic substances is important, due to CERCLNs explicit focus on 
public health, for the purposes of the following proposals, "medical 
monitoring" does not include examinations of affected individuals con-
ducted as part of a regimen for individual treatment. Both ideas 
attempt to diminish the unnecessary litigation currently surrounding 
the issue of medical monitoring while furthering efforts to handle the 
national crisis of hazardous substance contamination. 
A. By the Courts 
One alternative in handling medical monitoring cases would be to 
leave the courts to complete the interpretive task already begun in 
the lower courts, and in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,251 to 
establish a single, uniform method of deciding medical monitoring 
suits.252 If this judicial route is selected, future courts should align 
themselves with the decision in Brewer, and view expenses for medi-
cal testing and screening as permissible response costs under sections 
9607(a) and 9601(23) when the results are used to assess the effect of 
a toxic release on public health.253 Although the Brewer decision may 
more accurately be described as a refusal to discredit medical moni-
toring claims than an aggressive championing of them, clarifying the 
public health bent of medical monitoring itself would mitigate any 
opposition the Brewer decision may contain. Although the Brewer 
court ultimately found in favor of the recoverability of medical moni-
to provide minimal funding for the study of health effects, something we are not even doing 
now .... " 126 CONGo REC. H9617 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks by Rep. Moffett). 
250 See Weinstein, supra note 110, at 1390-91. 
251 See generally Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992). 
252 See Weinstein, supra note 110, at 1390-91. 
253 See Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
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toring costs for public welfare-type monitoring, the court made clear 
its position that individual treatment costs are unrecoverable as 
response costs, and indicated its concern regarding the potential 
for overlap of these two monitoring approaches in individual 
cases.254 By redefining medical monitoring in such a way as to spe-
cifically exclude observations conducted with a view to personal treat-
ment, these kinds of judicial concerns could be allayed. 
The redefinition would mean that medical monitoring would neces-
sarily and exclusively refer to public evaluation-oriented surveillance. 
In turn, this would have the practical effect of eliminating any uncer-
tainty regarding the appropriateness of terming medical monitoring 
a "response cost." Since costs "necessary" to evaluate a release of 
hazardous material constitute "removal" under subsection (23), and 
''removals'' are encompassed by ''responses,''255 which, in turn, are 
privately recoverable under section 9607(a)(1)-(4)(B),256 the recover-
ability of monitoring costs should be relatively clear. 
Allowing recovery of these costs should be permitted, even though 
monitoring is a preliminary cost relative to both private and govern-
mental cleanups.257 As one commentator has pointed out, conditioning 
access to funding on, among other factors, whether funds were spent 
on conceiving or implementing the cleanup seems at best, arbitrary.258 
Practically, neither of the two steps would be of any value without the 
other. What is not clear, however, is the status of the courts as the 
best vehicle for effecting this change. While, as this discussion indi-
cates, the courts could conceivably solve the medical monitoring prob-
lem by agreeing to follow Brewer, a judicial approach presents poten-
tial problems. Even given judicial consensus on the desirability of 
permitting recovery of medical monitoring costs as defined above, the 
large number of courts facing the issue seems destined to lead to 
inconsistency and variations in interpretation. Refining the definition 
of "medical monitoring" runs the risk of becoming only an academic 
exercise if different courts are left without guidance in interpreting 
this definition. The burden imposed on the courts through the con-
tinuation of this kind of discretion is likely to result in redefining 
"medical monitoring" with the same lack of uniformity suffered under 
current efforts at interpretation. Secondly, in addition to undermining 
2M See id. 
255 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23), 9607(a). 
256 See Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1178. 
257 See Gaba, supra note 75, at 215. 
258 See id. 
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the effectiveness of a more specific term, leaving medical monitoring 
in the hands ofthe court is counter to principles of judicial economy.259 
Given the finite nature of judical and financial resources, forcing the 
courts to consider medical monitoring on a case-by-case basis, even 
allowing them use of a more narrowly-defined medical monitoring 
standard, is unnecessary and wasteful. 
B. A Legislative Approach 
Despite the potential success of a judicial solution, a case-by-case 
determination is cumbersome and uncertain.260 A more efficient and 
satisfactory solution would be the development of a single substantive 
law which would make determining the outcome of medical monitor-
ing actions more certain. A legislative solution would eliminate much 
unnecessary litigation, and would facilitate settlement of legitimate 
claims.261 Legislative amendment of existing CERCLA provisions to 
include a provision for automatic medical monitoring to be conducted 
as part of every CERCLA cleanup action would serve this purpose. 
While opponents are likely to argue that such action would be costly 
and inefficient, these contentions lose much of their impact when 
considered in light of the existing state of CERCLA administration 
and the judicial alternatives for improving that administration, some 
of which are discussed in the previous section of this comment. First, 
and most convincingly, even given the initial cost of a legislative 
solution to the medical monitoring debate, cost is not CERCLNs only 
consideration. Opponents of medical monitoring argue that CERCLA 
was not enacted to redress all wrongs stemming from hazardous 
waste disposal; neither, however, was it designed to allow responsible 
parties to avoid making good on wrongs which are contemplated 
under CERCLA simply because those remedies are expensive. CER-
CLNs focus is the environment and public welfare, not cutting costs. 
Second, given the relative ease of modifying CERCLNs current 
provisions to accommodate these additions, cost is not the only con-
sideration.262 Even given the certainty that these modifications will 
involve some increased costs, the impact of arguments against any 
realistic increase is greatly reduced by the cost and inefficiency of the 
present case-by-case solutions and the proportions and potential ef-
fects of hazardous wastes. 
259 See Weinstein, supra note 110, at 1389. 
260 See id. at 1391; supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
261 See Weinstein, supra note 110, at 1392. 
262 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 950. 
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1. Practical Application of a Legislative Scheme 
a. Through the ATSDR 
For monitoring to be effective as a means of protecting public 
health by tracking the spread and effects of contamination, it must be 
widespread, including all sites addressed by CERCLA cleanups.263 
While the ATSDR is the most likely existing agency to handle these 
responsibilities, it cannot do so in its current form.264 Either the 
agency must be modified, or a new agency created to fill in the gaps 
left by the large-site focus of the current ATSD R. 265 
Retaining and expanding the current ATSDR is probably the best 
route to universal medical monitoring because of the ATSDR's ability 
to discharge its present duties, and for the practical considerations of 
existing sources of funding and existing organization. CERCLA's lan-
guage, particularly after the SARA amendments, authorizes the type 
of monitoring suggested here, but on a smaller scale.266 The critical 
problems appear to be in streamlining and funding the ATSDR to 
enable it to increase its monitoring capacity.267 Building monitoring 
into cleanup procedures would obviously increase total response costs. 
At least part of that cost, however, could be recouped in the form 
of time and materials saved by streamlining the existing monitoring 
system. As the procedure currently stands, the evaluation of waste 
sites includes at least three separate reporting efforts for every full-
scale assessment action.268 Simplifying the evaluation process would 
mean less legwork and thus, less time and financial burden, freeing 
both people and resources to work on more sites in a limited time. 
Additionally, by reorienting the ATSDR exclusively to monitoring, 
monies could be redirected from current use in medical care in cases 
of public emergency269 to future use in a uniform monitoring system 
where the long-term value of each dollar is likely to be greater. 
263 See id. at 946. 
264 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 
265 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 946. 
266 Section 9604(i)(6)(B) authorizes health assessments where individuals provide information 
that people have been exposed to toxic substances which are the probable cause of harm. See 
42 U .S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(B) (1988). 
267 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 
268 Evaluations involve: (1) initial assessment on advice of individual or physician, (2) report 
of assessment and results to EPA and each affected state, and (3) determination of whether to 
put site on NPL, conduct a pilot study on a control group of exposed individuals, and/or conduct 
a full-scale assessment. See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d] 13-36.14-36.15; supra notes 
78-89 and accompanying text. 
269 See Tanenbaum, supra note 4, at 935. 
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Cost-cutting measures, however, are clearly only loose ends rela-
tive to the total cost increase involved in expanding the dimensions 
of the ATSDR's monitoring system. Additional revenues would be 
required, and could be accrued by expanding the scope of current 
tax-based funding procedures270 to include more of the activities and 
products currently involved in or benefitting from waste-producing 
processes.271 
b. Through a New, Dependent Agency 
If, however, there is significant opposition to the idea of this refor-
mulation of the ATSDR, governmental control of monitoring might be 
handled by the creation of a new agency, to work as a companion to 
the ATSDR, and possibly under ATSDR control. Ideally, such an 
agency would be responsible only for monitoring actions. To prevent 
disputes about overlaps in territory, or inconsistency in administra-
tion, this subordinate agency would do best to assume all the 
ATSDR's current responsibility for actual monitoring, and leave the 
original ATSDR to its compilation duties.272 Funding and staffing is-
sues would have to be resolved in a manner similar to that which 
might be used for expanding the ATSDR. 
Despite the promise of such a new agency, however, opponents 
could be expected to argue convincingly that such a move would have 
drawbacks. The two major complaints would likely be those based on 
cost, and those questioning the wisdom of expanding an already in-
timidating bureaucratic system. Both these concerns may best be 
addressed less on the independent merits of a new agency, and more 
on the chances of success and improvement offered by the creation of 
such an agency, when compared with our present system. While there 
is no question that building and organizing a bureaucratic agency 
would be expensive, particularly in the startup phases, and would 
ultimately represent another office in a system already legendary for 
its massive inefficiency, these drawbacks simply do not outweigh the 
flaws in the system as it exists today. If a new agency is costly, it is 
no more so in the long view than a judical system with neither the 
ability nor the inclination to unify the decisions of a panoply of differ-
ent courts across the country. The same is true of questions regarding 
270 For a more detailed accounting of the sources and amounts of the taxes used to fund the 
SupeIiund, see the Ways and Means Committee Superfund Fact Sheet, 29 TAX NOTES 397, 
397-98 (Oct. 28, 1988). 
271 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
272 See COOKE, supra note 50, § 13.01[4][d] 13--36.13. 
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the efficiency of such a plan. While creating a new agency to do a job 
which might as well be performed by an existing office might be 
wasteful, the point is moot in the context of the medical monitoring 
issue. There is no existing agency tailored to do the job which a new 
agency could, and should, be outfitted specifically to perform. 
2. Consistency with CERCLA 
More important than the question of what can be done, and by 
whom, with respect to medical monitoring is the question of whether 
anything can be done at all without compromising CERCLA's pur-
poses. Medical monitoring as defined in this Comment is consistent 
with those purposes. In fact, given the relative novelty of hazardous 
substance contamination, a failure to monitor cleanup sites may do a 
great deal to frustrate CERCLA's effort to protect the public. 
Firstly, even if the legislative discussion described earlier in this 
Comment failed to show medical monitoring costs to have been antici-
pated and desired aspects of ''response costs," the fact that one part 
of the definition of "response" includes "long-term" or "permanent"273 
steps to control and eliminate hazardous wastes shows that CERCLA 
is not intended to be merely a short-term answer to the problem.274 
Reading the plain language of the definition strains logic unless this 
point can be conceded. If CERCLA is to be part of an extended 
measure to solve contamination crises, rather than just to delay their 
effects, then it clearly requires an information base on which to 
ground decisions about how cleanup actions are to take place.275 
Secondly, a broad definition of "response costs" is consistent with 
congressional intent to encourage private cleanup efforts.276 While 
private parties might recognize the need for a cleanup, there is little 
incentive to conduct any large-scale effort without assurances of the 
recoverability of the money spent in the cleanup. While, in theory, the 
government can still step in and orchestrate the cleanup on its own, 
practically, the government cannot handle the volume of sites crying 
for cleanup. Given this practical need for private party assistance, it 
seems not only wise, but critical that the definition of ''response costs" 
be expanded to provide private parties with clear incentives to lend 
a hand in cleanup efforts. 
273 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). 
274 See id. 
275 See Weinstein, supra note 110, at 1389 (complaints about judges' lack of survey information 
in determining likelihood of appearance of latent disease in persons subject to contamination or 
contaminated areas). 
276 See Gaba, supra note 75, at 215. 
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Thirdly, given the limitations inherent in the existing system, which 
focuses on a limited number of NPL sites,277 and within this limited 
pool, only on individuals' health data, an analysis of sites on the NPL 
provides information on a necessarily limited scale and for a time 
frame limited by individual health concerns. This limited information 
pool is insufficient to protect the public health over time. More sites 
would offer more detail and greater depth for analysis. Longer, stand-
ardized duration of study would offer the opportunity to observe and 
track the latent effects of exposure to contamination, and how con-
tamination spreads. This would be particularly helpful in preventing 
researchers from overlooking effects which are slow to appear, and 
which might surface in unforeseen locations or forms, and which, for 
just those reasons, are unlikely to be recognized by even the affected 
population as potential consequences of exposure to hazardous sub-
stances. 
Fourthly, this kind of monitoring also furthers CERCLA's goal of 
making potentially responsible parties bear the financial costs of their 
improper disposa1.278 There is no indication that CERCLA's drafters 
intended to limit liability for damage to the public and the environ-
ment to immediate injuries, and no reason responsible parties should 
escape liability for latent harm caused by their actions.279 More wide-
spread and intensive monitoring would provide a more complete pic-
ture of what contamination does, and of how it's effects spread, allow-
ing imposition of all liability, the most powerful disincentive for future 
contaminators. 
As the copious litigation, and the uneven outcomes of that litigation 
make clear, there is a need for a uniform system of decision-making 
regarding medical monitoring claims under CERCLA.280 Develop-
ment of such a system could take place either judicially or legisla-
tively. Although a legislative solution is potentially costly, it would 
have the advantage of conserving judicial resources while ensuring a 
high degree of uniformity across the country and the courts regarding 
the acceptability of recovery for medical monitoring costs under 
CERCLA. Accepting the legislative solution as preferable to a judi-
cial approach, the question becomes how best to administer the sys-
tem. Again, there appear to be two options: either expand the existing 
ATSDR to accommodate the additional concerns of a full-scale moni-
?:I7 Recall, in addition, that the NPL sites themselves only represent those sites selected for 
attention. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(H). Sites selected for placement on the NPL represent a handful 
of locations relative to the number of sites in need of cleanup. 
278 See generally id. § 9607. 
279 See id.; Gara, supra note 40, at 270. 
280 See supra note 118. 
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toring program, or create a new agency, perhaps administered under 
the eye of the existing ATSDR, to handle the monitoring duties cur-
rently assumed by the ATSDR, as well as any additional duties im-
posed subsequent to a legislative answer to the medical monitoring 
question. While expanding the ATSDR would mean bypassing the 
expense and procedure required to start up a new agency, it would 
also mean burdening the existing ATSDR with responsibilities it was 
not originally equipped to bear. Conversely, although building a new 
agency from scratch only increases the already sprawling governmen-
tal bureaucracy, such an agency, by concerning itself solely with moni-
toring issues, would free the existing ATSDR to dedicate itself en-
tirely to the information compilation for which it was originally 
formed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
When Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 as a hasty and perhaps 
ill-advised compromise, its purposes were to facilitate cleanup of haz-
ardous substances and to place the financial burden on those respon-
sible.281 Congress imposed these burdens in the interest of protecting 
the public and the environment.282 Given the circumstances of CER-
CLA's passage, its notoriously unclear language283 is not surprising. 
Despite the haste in which CERCLA was passed, explicit provision 
was made for recovery of monitoring costs incurred in the protection 
of the public. While the vagueness of these monitoring provisions may 
be excusable as the best attempts of a political system under pressure, 
allowing them to remain unclear in the face of the obvious need for 
permanent methods of handling toxic wastes is not acceptable. 
Adopting a judicial standard patterned after the Brewer decision, 
viewing medical monitoring as a necessary part of assessing and 
preventing contamination by toxic materials would be one way of 
eliminating much of the confusion. Modifying CERCLA either by 
expanding the duties of the ATSDR to include monitoring of all sites, 
or by creating a new office to which all monitoring responsibilities 
would be delegated, is another. The latter option faces greater obsta-
cles-including startup costs, budgeting, and staffing-than the for-
mer, but the cost is not the preeminent consideration, particularly in 
281 See supra notes 3 and 28 and accompanying text. 
282 See Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
283 See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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light of the urgency of the toxic waste problem,284 and the cost of 
continued litigation on the issue. 
To refuse to allow recovery for medical monitoring costs, and to 
overlook the critical importance in the information to be gained 
through extended medical surveillance of affected communities, is in 
effect to ignore the long-term threat toxic contamination poses to the 
environment and the people living there. The pure information to be 
gained by monitoring studies could translate into improved quality of 
life and longevity for entire communities. More important, though, is 
the effect that information would allow CERCLA to have on the 
problem as a whole. 
Sources agree that toxic waste and contamination have become a 
national, if not worldwide, crisis. As CERCLA stands now, it is a 
good-faith effort to mitigate the worst of the problem by containing 
and isolating the products of past misconduct and simple error from 
surrounding communities. The inclusion of medical monitoring into 
this system would perhaps significantly increase cost, but could po-
tentially increase the national benefits exponentially. A government 
informed by CERCLA monitoring of what present problems exist 
will become better able to use that knowledge to direct its energies 
away from frantic containment and toward considered prevention. In 
short, a plan as simple as the addition of health surveys of site-af-
fected communities could change CERCLA from a primarily reactive 
scheme to a powerfully proactive scheme; from a mere cleanup statute 
to a prevention statute. 
